



































Power distribution in the electoral body 
















This paper presents several new approaches to evaluate power distribution in an electoral body. We define the index 
of consistency of two groups’ positions (briefly, the consistency index) which is used to separate possible coalitions in the 
Parliament. This allows to analyze power distribution within restricted coalition formations. Then we provide several new 
power indices for the case in which the intensity of factions to coalesce is taken into account. Our analysis of the power 
distribution model extends the one proposed by Shapley-Owen. A new consistency index is given allowing to construct 
such an extension. We illustrate these approaches via the analysis of power distribution among factions in the Russian 
Parliament (Duma) from 1993 to 2005. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In  legislative bodies decisions are made by voting.  The decision  is accepted if the number of 
votes in favour exceeds a certain quota, which is defined by the voting procedure. For instance, in the 
Russian Parliament the quota for federal laws is equal to 226 votes (50% +1vote). If a parliament 
consists of three or more parties, there is a possibility that none of them possesses the votes which 
exceed a quota, so to make a decision the parties should coalesce. The coalitions which guarantee the 
necessary number of votes are of particular importance.   
Consider two examples. 
  
Example 1. Let three parties A, B and C, with 33, 33 and 33 seats respectively, be presented in 
a parliament, where the voting rule is the simple majority, i.e., 50 votes in favour. 
Then the winning coalitions are A+B, A+C, B+C, A+B+C and A, B and C are pivotal
1 in all 
but the grand coalition. If one measures the power of a party as a number of  winning coalitions in 
which it is pivotal, then all parties in this example have the same power. 
Let us now change the distribution of seats. Assume that the parties A, B and C have 48, 48 
and 3 seats respectively, and the voting rule is the same, i.e., 50 votes in favour. Then the winning 
coalitions are the same and the parties are pivotal in the same winning coalitions. Thus they have the 
same distribution of power.  
The distribution of power is studied using power indices. Below we will use the Banzhaf index 










i b  is the number of winning coalitions in which agent i is pivotal. This form of Banzhaf index is 
called the normalized one. Note that a non-normalized index of this kind was first introduced in [19].  
 
Example 2. Let us now consider the parliament with 100 seats in which three parties A, B and C 
are represented, with the distributions of seats among them being 50, 49, 1. Let the decision making 
rule be the simple majority, i.e., 51 votes in favour. Then the winning coalitions are A+B, B+C, 
A+B+C. The party A is pivotal in all three coalitions, B is pivotal only in the coalition A+B, and C is 
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Assume now that parties A and B never coalesce together, i.e. coalition A+B is impossible. 
However, let us assume that the coalition  A+B+C can be implemented, i.e. in the presence of  a 
`moderator' C, parties A and B can coalesce. Then the winning coalitions are A+C and A+B+C, and A 
is pivotal in both coalitions while C is in one; B is pivotal in none of the winning coalitions. In this 
case 3 / 2 ) ( = A b ,  0 ) ( = B b  and 3 / 1 ) ( = C b , i.e. although  B has almost half of the seats in the 
parliament, its power is equal to 0. 
If  A and  B never coalesce even in the presence of a moderator C, then the only winning 
coalition is A+C, in which both parties are pivotal. Then,  2 1/ ) C ( ) A ( = = b b . 
Such situations are found in real political life. For instance, the Russian Communist Party in 
the second Duma (1997-2000) had about 35% of seats; however, its power during that period was 
always almost equal to 0 [1]. 
                                                 
1 An agent i is called pivotal for a coalition if the latter becomes a loosing coalition when agent i leaves it.   3 
 
We study the problem of power distribution over time in groups and  factions of  the  Russian 
Parliament (Duma) using the Banzhaf index. The analysis is made under two main assumptions about 
coalition formation. First, we consider the case when all coalitions are admissible, and after we study 
several scenarios of coalition formation. To evaluate the possibility of two groups to coalesce we use 
different versions of the index of consistency of two groups’ positions. The index  is based on the 
similarity of voters in one act of voting or on the closeness of their positions on the political map.  
We study several qualitative scenarios of coalition formation, one of which is considered as real. 
This paper gives a short description of a study on distribution of power in the Russian Parliament 
between 1994-2005. The complete  study can be found in [1-3,5],  on the sites  www.hse.ru, 
www.ipu.ru/rcpp and  www.indem.ru. It contains a complete analysis of the power distribution in 
each electoral period (1994-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2005) with two decision rules 
(simple majority for federal laws and qualified majority - 300 out of 450 - for constitutional laws) 
using two power indices – the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices [21]. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents main notions and data used. Section 3 
provides an analysis of  power distribution in  the Russian Parliament using  the standard B anzhaf 
index. In Section  4  we define the  index  of consistency of two  groups’ positions  (briefly, the 
consistency index) and analyze power distribution within a restricted coalition formation. Section 5 
provides several new power indices for the case in which the intensity of factions to coalesce is taken 
into account. We consider an analysis of power distribution in the Russian Parliament for two out of 
many intensity functions introduced in [1,2]. Section 6 contains the analysis of the power distribution 
model proposed by Shapley-Owen in a spatial context when the agents have ideal (bliss) points on a 
political map. We define here a new consistency index and use it to propose an extension of the 
Shapley-Owen index. Then we give an analysis of power distribution in the Russian Parliament using 





2.  Main notions and data used  
 
The set of agents (parties, factions) is denoted as N,   } , , 1 { n N K = , n>1. A coalition  w  is a 
subset of N,  N ˝ w . We consider the situation in which the decision of a body is made by voting 
procedure; agents who do not vote `yes’ vote against it, i.e. abstention is not allowed. 
Each agent has a predefined number of votes,  n i vi , , 1    , 0 K = > . It is assumed that a quota q 
is predetermined as well and that the voting with quota is used as a decision making rule, i.e. the 
decision is made if the number of votes for it is not less than q,  
q v
i
i ‡ ￿ . 
The model describes a voting by simple and qualified majority, voting with veto (as in the 
Security Council of UN), etc. 
A coalition w  is called winning if the sum of votes in the coalition is not less than q. An agent 
i is called pivotal in the coalition w  if the coalition  } { \ i w  is a loosing one. 
For such a  voting rule the set of all winning coalitions  W  possesses the following  three 
properties: 
       W fˇ ,  W ˛ N ,  W w w w W w ˛ ￿ ˚ ˛ ' ' ,   . 
Sometimes, one additional condition is applied as well 
, \ N W w W w ˇ ￿ ˛    4 
implying  Ø ø 2 / n q ‡ , where  Ø ø x  is the smallest integer greater or equal to x. 
The system of winning coalitions constitutes an  n-person simple game in the form of 
characteristic function, i.e. every coalition S˝N gets a payoff equal to 0 or 1 [21].  
 
The data. Between 1993-2007 the Russian Parliament consisted of 450 members, half of them 
being elected by majority voting and the other half by party lists
2. Factions had been created by 
electoral blocks which passed by proportional representation scheme. Moreover, there was a 
possibility to create MP groups with no less than 35 members (until 2004). Decision making rules are 
simple majority (226 votes) for federal laws and 2/3 (300) votes for constitutional laws.  
We have considered the structure of factions and groups on 16
th of each month for each of the 
three parliaments separately (1994-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003) and for part of the 4
th Parliament 
(2004-2005).  
Using this structure we have calculated the Banzhaf index for federal laws. These evaluations 
were first made under the assumption that all coalitions are equally feasible, and then after excluding 




3.  Power distribution in  the  Russian parliament without restrictions on 
coalition formation 
 
In the case considered in this Section the changes in power distribution are observed only due to 
the transfers of MPs from one group or faction to the other. Moreover, essential changes will be 
observed at the moment of huge transfers of MPs which are usually connected with the formation, 
sometimes unsuccessful, of new factions or groups.  
We have used the following scheme to distribute independent MPs to factions and groups: we 
distribute them to those factions to which they will transfer afterwards or to which they had belonged 
before. If none of these situations holds, we studied their political interests and attributed each MP to 
the group with the closest interests.  
In fact, we  also  evaluated  the  power  index for independent MPs separately. The difference 
between the two approaches led to a difference in power indices of less than 1%.  
 
Let u s now discuss the results. In all three parliaments the following three parties were 
represented 
-  Agrarians (Agrarian Group of Russia, APG)  
-  Communists (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF) 
-  Liberal-Democrats (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, LDPR) 
-  Yabloko. 
Additionally, in the second and third parliaments the group “Regions of Russia” was represented, 
and in the third Duma pro-presidential parties Edinstvo and OVR and liberal party SPS were also 
represented. 
The changes in power distribution are shown in Fig.1. Communists as well as Yabloko had the 
maximal of their power in the second  Duma; however, the power of Communists had been 
decreasing from the beginning of the second parliament through the third one. Agrarians in general 
had a power of about 9.3%. Liberal-Democrats had been losing their power during all those years. In 
the first parliament it was one of the most powerful parties, while in the third parliament it was one of 
the weakest parties. The group Regions of Russia had almost stable power of about 10%. 
                                                 
2 From 2007 the Russian Parliament is elected by party lists only.    5 
The power of groups and the share of their votes  for the first and third parliaments were 
consistent, i.e. for factions and groups their power values and share of seats were almost equal. 
Another picture can be seen in the second parliament, in which there had been one strong faction 
(Communists) and 6 small groups. On average the power of Communists exceeded its share of votes 
by 26%, and had the maximum at the beginning of the second parliament when this difference was 
30%. For Our Home – Russia this difference was on average 33%, Liberal-Democrats – 19%, for 
Yabloko –15%, etc. In other words, in the second Duma – compared to the first and third ones - the 
distribution of power did not correspond to the distribution of seats. 
 
4.  The consistency index 
 
Now we will study the approach allowing to separate admissible coalitions from those which are 
not. The relation between two groups of MPs is naturally reflected by the results of voting. Groups 
with similar political positions having common political interests initiate consistent bills and support 
them in voting. On the contrary, groups with opposite interests vote in a different way. This point of 
view is supported by the observation of voting behavior in the Russian parliament.  
Let  1 q   and   2 q  be the share of ‘ay’ votes in two groups of MPs. 
The consistency index is calculated as 
( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1
2 1
2 1 1 , , 1 , max
1 ,





- = . 
 
In other words, if in two groups the share of ‘ay’ votes is equal, then these groups are considered 
as consistent. The groups are totally inconsistent (c= -1) if one group votes ‘ay’ while another group 
votes ‘no’. The properties of the consistency index were studied in [7]. 














To evaluate this mean value we select votings on the basis of several criteria which express 
different information about voting and division among factions and MPs. We assume that  the 
abstention of a MP usually indicates disagreement with the bill. In general, the selection of the result 
of voting is made in two stages. First, we select those results in which even with very few votes 
against a bill one can obtain the essential difference of votes for and against in at least two factions. 
For each voting result we calculate the difference between maximal and minimal over factions’ share 
of “ay” votes, and then choose those results for which this measure exceeds some predetermined 
threshold. Then the ‘non-important’ votings are excluded from the list of results, for instance those 
for which the bill is supported by no less than 30 votes or by at least 320 votes “ay”. Finally, we did 
not take into consideration the results in which the difference in voting among factions is caused by 
some technical reasons, and when furthermore such bills are voted anew. 
 
The analysis of the parliament when not all coalitions are feasible. The assumption that all 
coalitions are feasible is too strong. For instance, in the  First  Russian P arliament the c oalition 
between C hoice of Russia (main pro-presidential party) and Communists  was hardly possible. 
Obviously, the real power distribution was not stable in all three parliaments in the light of many 
changes that had been happening during all those years. At that time many bills dealing with the most   6 
important changes in the country, from constitutional reforms to the reforms of natural monopolists, 
were approved.  
To construct a power distribution more adequate to the real situation, it is necessary to measure 
the p ossibility of coalition formation depending on the relations among groups of MPs. We 
constructed the model of coalition formation depending on a threshold value of the consistency index. 
At the beginning the impossible coalitions  were excluded by the introduction of different 
threshold values of  the  consistency index. The consistency index introduced above had been 
calculated for all pairs of groups and factions in the parliament from 1994 to 2005 for all results of 
voting described above. According to this approach, a coalition is considered to be impossible if the 
value of the consistency index for two groups in the coalition is less than the threshold value of that 
index. 
It is assumed that under a certain threshold level the evaluated power index should be close to its 
real value. We consider three values of threshold for each consistency index and, thus, three different 
distributions of power index. The three threshold values are
3  4 . 0 ‡ ? ,  5 . 0 ‡ ? ,  6 . 0 ‡ ? . 
The choice of the threshold 0.5 is obvious and does not need any additional explanation. The 
choice of  the  other levels needs some explanation. The evaluation of  the  consistency index for 
explicit ideological contestants shows that in this case the value of  ?does not exceed 0.4. The value 
of the consistency index between 0.5 and 0.7 corresponds to the relations from potential allies to full 
allies. The threshold value 0.6 gives from one point of view a minimal level of allies relations and, 
from the other point of view, preserves enough possibilities for coalition formation. 
So the key question is which value of  the  consistency index generates power distribution 
reflecting real power distribution in  the Russian Parliament? The answer to this question has been 
given on the basis of a scenario approach applying to coalition formation mechanisms.  
To construct scenarios, a scale was suggested for the evaluation of relations among groups and 
factions in the parliament. This scale includes four grades: explicit “contestants”, potential 
contestants, potential allies, explicit allies. Using these grades three scenarios were constructed: 
-  “mild” scenario (coalitions with explicit contestants are excluded); 
-  “average” scenario (coalitions with explicit and potential contestants are excluded); 
-  “rigid” scenario (only coalitions with the closest allies are allowed). 
The scenario in which all coalitions are admissible can be called null-scenario. 
Mild scenario is by definition a real one. Indeed, the strategy that allows potential contestants to 
be included in a coalition seems to be in some sense optimal. It leaves enough freedom for coalition 
formation but excludes uncompensated  losses a party could meet if it coalesced with explicit 
contestants, which cannot be forgiven from the point of view of the electorate. One may expect that 
experienced politicians managing political factions and groups in the Russian Parliament follow this 
optimal strategy. 
The average scenario is interesting in that it allows to evaluate the abilities of the participants in 
the political process. For heavy players which fill the extreme positions it is an ability to attract the 
majority of voters; for the players at the center of the political field it is an ability to participate in 
winning coalitions. 
In the rigid scenario, situations in which coalitions are formed only with the closest allies are of 
particular importance. 
The change over time in the consistency index for pair of party factions in the third Duma is 
given in Fig.2. 
As can be seen, Communists and Agrarians are the closest allies, their consistency index is about 
0.85. On the contrary, the relation between Communists and Edinstvo is worsening over time, 
achieving a level of about 0.1. It is important to note that the minimum of the index for this pair is 
seen in July 2001, the moment when the most crucial decisions were made. 
                                                 
3 In [3] the analysis for threshold values less than 0.4 is made as well.   7 
The dynamics of the consistency index for Edinstvo and OVR reflect the process of organization 
of the largest party in the parliament - Edinaya Rossiya. After January 2002 both parties are the 
closest allies, their consistency index is greater than 0.8. 
We show the dynamics of power indices for large parties in Figs. 4-6 below, for the scenarios 
c=0.4, 0.5, and 0.6, respectively. In Figs. 4-5 the standard Banzhaf index values are given as well. 
The share of votes for the faction of Communists was on average 18% while their value of the 
Banzhaf index was much smaller and from July 2001 it did not exceed 3%. The factions Edinstvo and 
Narodny Deputat had a power greater than their share of votes. 
In general, the following conclusions can be derived from the results obtained: 
In scenario  c=0.4, the centrist  factions increase their power since they do not have explicit 
contestants.  Thus, they possess the same possibilities as in the null-scenario (all coalitions are 
admissible). On the contrary, groups expressing extreme positions and having large contestants 
should expect serious losses. 
In scenario c=0.5, maximal losses should be expected by those  factions which coalesce with 
potential contestants. T he groups which can create majority using explicit and potential allies 
preserve or even increase their power. 
In scenario c=0.6, those groups which can create majority leaning only  on explicit allies can 
preserve their power. 
The distribution observed for scenario c=0.4 is the closest to real power distribution. 
Let us discuss it in detail. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the share of votes of the CPRF faction in 
the third Duma is on average equal to 19% while the power index value for this faction equals only to 
3%. A similar situation is seen for Agrarians, the closest ally of Communists. It exactly fits the 
hypothesis that factions with extreme views suffer more than centrist factions. 
On the contrary, the power index values for the groups Narodny Deputat, OVR and Regions of 
Russia are higher than their shares of votes, which fits the hypothesis about the centrist factions. 
The faction of Edinstvo also has more power than its share of votes. It is due to the fact that a 
centrist majority had been formed around this very faction.   
 
5. Intensity functions, ordinal and cardinal power indices 
Here we introduce new indices based on an idea similar to the Banzhaf power index, taking 
however into account agents' preferences to coalesce. 
In these indices we used the information about agents' preferences over other agents. These 
preferences are assumed to be linear orders. Since these preferences may not be symmetric, the desire 
of agent 1 to coalesce with agent 2 can be different from the desire of agent 2 to coalesce with agent 
1. The indices take into account this asymmetry of preferences differently and are constructed on the 
following basis: the intensity of connection  ) , i ( f w  of the agent with other members of  w  is 
defined. Then for an agent i the value  i c  is evaluated as 
( ) ￿ =
w
w c , , i f i  
i.e., the sum of intensities of connections of  i over those coalitions w  in which i is pivotal. Naturally, 
other functions can be considered instead of summation. 










The very idea of  ( ) i a  is the same as for the Banzhaf index, with the difference that in the 
Banzhaf index we evaluate the number of coalitions in which  i is pivotal, i.e.  ) , i ( f w  in the 
definition of  the Banzhaf index is equal to 1; on the contrary, in our case it can be less than 1. 
The main question now is how to construct the intensity functions  ) , i ( f w . Below we give 
two different forms of these functions.   8 
Each agent i is assumed to have a linear order
4  i P revealing her preferences over other agents 
in the sense that i prefers to coalesce with agent j rather than with agent k if  i P contains the pair (j, k). 
Obviously,  i P is defined on the Cartesian product }) { \ ( }) { \ ( i N i N · . 
Since  i P  is a linear order, the rank  ij p  of the agent j in   i P  can be defined. We assume that 
N pij = -1 for the most preferable agent j in  i P . 
The value  ij p  shows how many agents less preferable than j are in  i P . For instance, if N 
={A,B,C,D} and  D C B PA f f   : , then   = AB P 3,  = AC P  2 and  = AD P 1. 
Using these ranks, one can construct different intensity functions. 
A second way of constructing  ) ( w , i f  is based on the idea that the values  ij p  of connection 
of  i  with  j are  somehow  predetermined. In general, it is not assumed that ji ij p p = . Then the 
intensity function can be constructed as above. 
Below we give three different ways to construct  ) ( w , i f  in an ordinal case and only one  way 
of constructing the cardinal function ) ( w , i f . Other forms of intensity functions can be found in [1]. 
Ordinal indices. For each coalition  w  and each agent i now construct an intensity  ) , i ( f w  
of connections in this coalition. In other words, f is a function which maps  W · N (=
N 2 \{Ø}) 
into
1 R ,
1 R N : f ﬁ · W . This very value  ) , i ( f w  is evaluated using the ranks of members of  the 
coalition. Three different ways to evaluate f using different information about agents’ preferences are 
provided: 
a) Intensity of i’s preferences. In this form only the preferences of i’s agent over other agents 








i f ) , (  
b) Intensity of preferences for i. In this case consider the sum of ranks of i given by other 








i f ) , (  
c) Average intensity with respect to i’s agent 
2








Let’s now consider several examples. 
Example 3. Let n=3, N={A,  B, C},  = ) (A n 33,  33 ) ( ) ( = = C B n n , q=50. Consider the  two 




                                                 
4 i.e. irreflexive, transitive and connected binary relation. We often denote it as  f.   9 
A P   B P   C P  
C  C  A 
B  A  B 
Table 1. First preference profile 
 
A P   B P   C P  
B  C  A 
C  A  B 
Table 2. Second preference profile 
 
For both preference profiles there are three winning coalitions in which agents are pivotal. 
These coalitions are A+B, A+C and B+C. 
Let us calculate the functions  f as above for each agent in each winning coalition. The 
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p ij  
Now, for the profile given in Table 1, we can calculate the values of intensities a)-c) obtained 
by each agent i in each winning coalition  w . Using these intensity functions we can now define the 
corresponding power indices ) i ( a . Let i   be a pivotal agent in a winning coalition w . Denote by  i c  
the number equal to the value of the intensity function for a given coalition  w  and agent i. Then the 


















in     pivotal   is   
,             
in     pivotal   is   
,             
 
  
) (  
The indices  ) (i a  will be denoted by ) ( , ), ( 3 1 i i a a K .  
Let us now evaluate the values  ) ( ), ( 2 1 ￿ ￿ a a  for all agents for the preference profile from Table 
1. 
The agent A (as well as agents B and C) is pivotal in two coalitions; the sum of the values 
) , ( w i f
+  for each i is equal to 3/2. Then   10 
. ) ( ) (
3
1
2 / 3 2 / 3 2 / 3
2 / 3
) ( 1 1 1 C B A a a a = = =
+ +
=  
The value  ) ( 2 ￿ a  is evaluated differently. The sum of values  ) , ( w i f
-  from Table 3 for all i 
and w  is equal to 9/2. However, for A ￿ =
w
w 2 / 3 ) , (A f , ￿ =
w
w 1 ) , (B f  and ￿ =
w





) ( 2 = = A a ; 
9
2
) ( 2 = B a  and  
9
4
) ( 2 = C a . 
The values of the indices  1 a – 3 a  for both preference profiles are given in Table 3 as well as 
the values of the Banzhaf index  b  
 
First profile (Table 1)  Second profile (Table 2)   
A  B  C  A  B  C 
1 a   1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3 
2 a   1/3  2/9  4/9  1/3  1/3  1/3 
3 a   1/3  5/18  7/18  1/3  1/3  1/3 
b   1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3  1/3 
Table 3. Power indices values 
 
Let’s now consider another example. 
Example 4. Consider the case where 3 parties A, B and C have 50, 49 and 1 seats respectively. 
Assume that  the simple majority is the decision making rule, i.e. 51 votes. Then the winning 
coalitions are A+B, A+C and A+B+C. Note that A is pivotal in all three coalitions, B and C are 
pivotal in one coalition each. Then 5 / 3 ) ( = A b ,  5 / 1 ) ( ) ( = = C B b b . 
Now consider the case with the preferences of agents given below: B C : PA f ;  A C P B f :  
and  B A : PC f . 
Then the values of  1 a  and  2 a  (constructed by  ) , ( w i f
+  and  ) , ( w i f
- ) are as follows 
3 / 1 ) (     , 4 / 1 ) (      , 12 / 5 ) ( 1 1 1 = = = C B A a a a , 
18 / 7 ) (     , 36 / 7 ) (      , 12 / 5 ) ( 2 2 2 = = = C B A a a a .   11 
  Consider another preference profile: B C : PA f , B C P B f : ; A B P C f : , i.e. only agent  C 
changes her preferences. Then one can easily evaluate 11 / 3 ) (     , 11 / 3 ) (      , 11 / 5 ) ( 1 1 1 = = = C B A a a a ; 
33 / 10 ) ( 2 = A a ,  11 / 3 ) ( 2 = B a ,  33 / 14 ) ( 2 = C a . 
 
In the second type of power index the information about the intensity of preferences is taken 
into account as well, i.e. we extend the former type of power index to cardinal information about 
agents' preferences. 
 
Cardinal  indices. Let us now assume that the desire of party i  to coalesce with party j  is 
given as real number  ij p ,  n j i p
j
ij , , 1 ,    , 1 K = = ￿ . In general, it is not assumed that  ji ij p p = . 
We can call the value  ij p  as an intensity of connection of i with j. It may be, for instance, 
interpreted as a probability for i to form a coalition with j. 
As in the previous case, we now define several intensity functions: 
a) average intensity of  i in connection with other members of coalition w  







i f  
b) average intensity of connection of other members of coalition w  with i  
;
p







˛ - =  
c) average intensity for i 
)). , ( ) , ( (
2
1
) , ( w w w i f i f i f
- + + =  
 
Using the consistency index defined above as the cardinal intensity function we can construct 
the power distribution for the Russian Parliament. The value of the index  1 a  for the third Duma is 
given i n Fig.  6. One  can see that the graphs are smoother than in the previous case when the 
‘threshold’ model of coalition formation was used. In fact, such a model can be used here as well.   
In [ 1,2] an axiomatic construction of the first cardinal intensity function is given. O ther 
intensity functions can be constructed in an analogous way. 
   12 
6.  Extended Shapley-Owen index and power  distribution  in  the  Russian 
Parliament  
In the Shapley-Owen index the power of an agent depends not only on the voting rule of decision 
making, but on the position of agents in  the spatial context, or in the political space [20], i.e. on 
ideology as well. This index (the Shapley-Owen value, for short SOV [17]) gives a special role to an 
ideology in coalition formation, i.e. only the ideologically close agents will coalesce.  
Let each player has her own ideal point  m
i P ￿ ˛  in m-dimensional Euclidean space. The ideal 
points reflect the preferential political outcomes of each player. Let 
m Y˝￿  be a set of all the 
outcomes of voting. Each outcome is a vectorx˛Y. 
Assume that function  ( ) i ux such as  :
m
i u Yﬁ￿  exists for each player and measures the level of 
the player's attitude to the outcome x. Using the values of this function, a strict order  fcan be defined 
on the set N, thus,  ji f , if  ( ) ( ) 0 ji uxux -‡ . This relation indicates that player j likes the outcome x 
more than i.  
Define  ( ) ( ). ijij Yuxux =-  If  0 ij Y £ , then j joins a coalition of players supporting the outcome x 
more willingly than i. Owen and Shapley introduced the player's power index in the spatial context. 
They considered unit vectors 
m x˛￿   on the unit-sphere 
1 m H
- ,  ,1 xxx "˛Y= . Each v ector 
defines a direction in space. It was proposed that the function values are determined by the inner 
product  (),. ii uxxP =  Then each unit vector x randomly chosen from uniform distribution induces 
an order relation  f  as  ,, Uij ijUPUP ￿‡ f . 









where  i q  is the number of orderings, for which player  i is pivotal, n! is the total number of all 
possible orderings. Effective computational scheme for the evaluation of SOV is given in [11].  
We now extend the Shapley-Owen index using the notion of the consistency of the players’ 
positions. 
Let  ij d  be the Euclidean distance between ideal points of players i and j in a normalized two-













                               (1) 
In the Shapley-Owen model a player is pivotal if she occupies the median position in the linear 
order obtained on each step, i.e. the pivotal player splits the set of players N to two disjoint sets, 
where one of them is a winning coalition. 
Denote as S the coalition located on the left of the pivotal player in linear order obtained on a 
certain step, and as T the one on the right of the pivotal player (see Fig. 7). The pivotal player can 
make each of these coalitions winning after joining them.  





=„ ￿ ,                               (2) 
It is computed  as the  sum of indices of consistency for each step  m=1,..,t, i.e. for each 
increment of angle of line rotation about origin of the considered political space. Summation in (2) 
includes that parties j enter this coalition, which i can make winning, and l is the number of players of 
this coalition.    13 
So two numbers of the weight value are computed, both by the sum of the index of consistency 
of  pivotal position and the players of coalition S positions and by the sum of the index of consistency 
of pivotal position and the players of coalition T positions. The largest weight is chosen, meaning that 
the pivotal player enters the coalition with players being more consistent with him. 
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,                 (4) 
where  iij
j
nn l = ￿  is the share of votes, and  i n  is the number of votes of party i.  
Two more indices can be constructed based on this very idea: one based on the consistency of 
the players’ positions without taking into account the share of votes of each agent and another one 
based on the consistency of the player's ideal point to the system of players ‘center of mass’ [5] 
 
Let us now compute the power for the political parties in the III State Duma of the Russian 
Federation using the power index introduced above. The data about players’ preferences covers the 
State Duma of the Russian Federation for each month from 2000 to 2003. 
The issue space consists of two dimensions defined as "Liberal – State oriented" (horizontal 
axis) and "Antireform – Pro-reform oriented" (vertical axis). Each dimension is measured using a 
floating-point scale ranging from -1 to 1. The preferences of players are Euclidean. The decision rule 
is the simple majority rule. This political map (issue space) has been obtained using factor analysis of 
votings in that Duma [1].  
Fig. 8-11 represent the average distribution of power  1 PI  of all parties for the period under 
study. As we can see i n Fig. 9, for instance, the party "Narodny deputat" was the leader at the 
beginning of 2000, its  1 0.29 PI » . But in 2001 the value of its power became lower,  1 0.25 PI » . In 
2002 the average value of power index of "Narodny deputat" declined,  1 0.16 PI » . This effect can be 
explained by the fact that at the beginning of the third Duma this party ‘started’ as centrist, its motion 
pass occupied a considerable area [1]. But by 2002 it is noted that ideal points of this party migrated 
from the center to the top left corner of the political map and the area of motion path has decreased 
leading  to the reduction of frequency of events in which this party was pivotal.  
The party "Regions of Russia" in 2000 had  1 0.16 PI » , it was the second with respect to  
power distribution, and the average value of its power grew constantly during all the period under 
study. In 2003 its  1 0.33 PI »  and as we can see this value was twice as large by the end of 2003. This 
shows that the frequency of events in which this party was pivotal had increased. The political map of 
"Regions of Russia" motion paths shows that the party ideal points movement was active, and the 
ideal points area was considerably wide.  
Agrarians were in the third place with  1 0.14 PI » , but the average value of  the index  1 PI  
strongly decreased by 2002 ( 1 0.058 PI » ), and by the end of  the period it was almost  the same 
( 1 0.078 PI » ).  Communists and OVR were the next in our rating with  1 0.12 PI » .  
Communists had an almost constant average value of index during the whole period of 2000-
2003.    14 
The average value of the index  1 PI  of group OVR changed strongly: in 2001  1 0.183 PI » , in 
2002 this value was  0.077.  "Edinstvo" had strong changes in its power for all the period of 2000-
2003. In 2000 the average value of its power was approximately 0.08, but by 2002 the power of this 
party  had increased strongly, more than 50 percent,  1 0.189 PI » .  All of these four factions have 
strong party discipline.  
Till then the OVR group unified with "Edinstvo" in December of 2001. Factions SPS, LDPR, 
"Yabloko" were tiny groups and they were at the end of the power distribution rating. The average 
values of their power were less than 0.05 and there were not any important changes in these values 
during all this  period.  
Thus, it may be concluded that both the greatest power values and strong power changes in 
time have been shown by those parties which change their political position permanently. It means 
that these groups did not have a fixed political position, they could maneuver in order to receive 
strategic advantages. Such power is called payoff-power (or P-power) [9]. Therefore, our power 
index measures the degree of player's ability to predict and adjust to outcome. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by political maps of ideal point motion paths, presented month by month for each year [1].  
The ideal points of such groups migrate throughout the political space.  
One of the findings obtained in the work is that if we construct a trajectory of faction positions 
on the political map, each point corresponding to the position of a faction in a chosen month, we can 
see to which extent the overall behavior of a party was volatile or stable. The graphs in Figs. 12-15 
present these very trajectories for the third Duma. As one can see, Communists and Edinstvo have 
rather tight positions during all these years. On the other hand, one of the main liberal parties in 
Russia – Yabloko – drifted to Communist position for half a year before elections in 2003. Narodny 
deputat passed through almost all planes during these 4 years. 
The parties with a small power index have exact political views, firm politics, and try to find 
the way to effect the outcome of voting. Such power is called influence-power (or I-power) [9].  
Let us go back to Figs. 8-11. As we can see in Fig. 8 there is a peak of Communists  1 PI  in 
autumn of 2000. This peak is associated with their behavior during the discussion in the Parliament of 
the bill for children benefits supported by Communists, Agrarians (the power value of APG has also 
increased to 0.2), Narodny deputat and Regions of Russia. Majority (263 votes) voted for this bill, but 
it was not passed because of the Federation Council veto (300 votes were necessary to override the 
veto).  
The next power value peak, observed in May of 2002, corresponds to the alternative military 
service federal law. The leftists assemble the majority to defeat this bill. From May to September of 
2003 the power of CPRF declined. It can be explained by the adoption of certain bills, for example 
the bill of local government reform or federal budget bill, as well as by the non-confidence vote to 
government. In all these votes CPRF was always in minority.  
In Fig. 8 the power distribution of Edinstvo is presented. Examining the most important power 
value changes, it should be noted that there are repeated falls in power to the zero value during the 
whole period. A first such fall is observed in December of 2000 and January-February of 2001, when 
laws concerning nuclear exhaust problems had been considered. In 2001 the amendments to these 
acts allowed the import in Russia of nuclear exhausts for technological storage as well as for waste 
disposal. Edinstvo and LDPR had consolidated for the law to pass (Fig. 11) and had power value fall 
at the same time. In addition the decrease of power value for Edinstvo and LDPR can be explained by 
the fact that they were in majority when amendments to pension federal law had been considered 
since they voted against those amendments. The next fall in Edinstvo power value is observed in 
November-December of 2001, when the questions of judicial authority reform were discussed. 
Centrists had to reconcile their viewpoints with leftists and liberal factions for the adoption of this 
bill. The left liberal factions took an advantage of the law liberalization. Thus, increments of power 
value of SPS, LDPR, APG are observed (power value for SPS increased to 0.107, this value was the 
highest for SPS, APG had  1 0.138 PI = , LDPR had  1 0.05 PI = ). The power value peak of Edinstvo 
can be observed in spring of 2002,  1 0.4 PI = . This peak can be aligned with the break of the so-called   15 
package agreement, accepted at the beginning of 2000. The package agreement break was initiated by 
centrist factions and had been supported by SPS and Yabloko. Edinstvo was a key player in that 
voting. The next most important power value peak of Edinstvo is observed in September-November 
of 2002, it can be explained by the adoption of the federal referendum law of the Russian Federation. 
This draft law proposed by Edinstvo was supported by all factions except Communists and Agrarians.  
In  Fig. 9 changes in the centrist factions power distribution, namely Narodny deputat and 
OVR, are given. There are strong changes of power observed for these factions. In January-February 
of 2001 a power value peak is observed that can be explained by alteration in the federal law of 
pensions.  Narodny deputat was the pivotal player in this voting when the veto had been negotiated. 
There is the power growth observed for Narodny deputat and OVR in September-November of 2001. 
Narodny deputat had  1 0.45 PI =  and OVR had  1 0.266 PI = , one of the most important peaks of this 
party. It can be associated with  the adoption of the most important bill of 2001, the Russian 
Federation labor code. All factions except C ommunists and Agrarians  voted for this law, and 
Narodny deputat was pivotal in that voting. Faction OVR had another peak, observed in December of 
2000. This is one of the highest values at that period, when the Russian Federation national symbol 
legislative package was supported by all parties except SPS and Yabloko. The reason of this peak 
appearance is that  OVR was decisive in that voting.  
In Fig. 10 power distribution curves of small groups, namely Regions of Russia and APG, are 
represented. Regions of Russia had the most interesting and important results in May-June of 2001, 
when its power increased to 0.42. T his  was the highest value at this  period. This peak can be 
explained by the law of political party consideration. Edinstvo, OVR, LDPR, N arodny deputat, 
Yabloko and Regions of Russia voted for this law. The votes of Regions of Russia were decisive in 
this voting, and that was the reason of the power value growth. There is one more peak in the Regions 
of Russia power value observed in January-February of 2002, its  value 1 0.52 PI » . At this time 
interval certain bills had been  considered, namely the act of nationalization, the termination of 
broadcasting of TV6 act, the nationality law, the act of electric and heat energy rate management. 
Regions of Russia was in majority  in voting  for these laws, and  the  power value peak can be 
explained by the fact that Regions of Russia was the pivotal player in these votes. The next peak in 
the Regions of Russia power value is observed in March-April of 2003,  1 0.51 PI » , when problems 
of housing and communal services reform had been examined. The act of housing and communal 
services reform was accepted in third reading after some amendments to this act, and Regions of 
Russia was a pivotal player.    
  As one can see the extended power index differs from SOV results. The most important 
changes are observed for CPRF and its ally APG. The power value of these parties is higher than 
SOV. On the contrary, for parties Narodny deputat and LDPR this value is lower than SOV.  
The results obtained from the extended Shapley-Owen power index and SOV computed for 
political parties of the III State Duma correlate badly with the results computed in Section 3. Those 
results show that the most powerful groups were the Edinstvo and CPRF parties, Narodny deputat 
and OVR took  the third and fourth places accordingly,  and the last were Regions of Russia, APG 
and SPS, respectively.  
Results coincide for tiny groups of III Duma, namely for SPS, LDPR and Yabloko. Power 
analysis on the basis of both standard Banzaf and extended Shapley-Owen indices shows that the 
power of these groups is very low.  
Similarly the results coincide for OVR and APG, both analyses pointing out that these parties 
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7. Conclusion 
We conclude the paper with several remarks. 
 
Remark 1. The suggested approach is valid when the following assumption holds. First, factions 
vote homogeneously. This assumption seems to be true for the French Parliament, but not for the 
Russian one. Then the assumption above should be substituted by another assumption – the deviation 
of faction discipline is the same in all  factions with respect to the member of MPs in each faction. 
This assumption seems to be strong as well. 
Then our assumption can be re-formulated as follows: the deviation of homogeneous behavior in 
each faction is small, contingent and independent from factions and votings. Then the balance of 
power among opposing coalitions will on average be stable over time. 
One can expect that the latter case is the closest to the real behavior of parties. On the other hand, 
the results obtained can be used as indirect proof of this assumption. 
 
Remark 2. Among other problems considered in [3], there was a problem of analysis of power 
distribution when factions express their opinions on different issues. Issues such as social policy, 
attitude to the government and oil/gas sectors of economy were chosen. The results obtained for these 
cases w ere different from the case in which all votings are considered altogether. However, the 
difference was not so crucial as one might expect.    
 
Remark 3. In the fourth and also in the newly-elected fifth Duma in December 2007, there is only 
one  ‘power holder’, the party Edinaya Rossiya, which possesses the majority sufficient for 
constitutional laws passage. However, it is well known that this party consists of several ‘wings’ 
representing different opinions, from liberal to centrist and even conservative. On the other hand, the 
regional interests of groups in this party are also different. One of the directions of research in the 
analysis of power distribution in the fifth Duma is to study the power distribution among regional 
groups of different parties. It is a very complex computational problem which may be solved using a 
particular approach. 
 
Remark 4. One of the routes to overcome the high complexity of evaluation of power indices for 
large societies is the use of generating functions – a special type of polynomials which are widely 
used in combinatorial theory. It has been shown how to use these functions for evaluating power 
indices in the case of unrestricted coalition formation [8] as well as restricted coalition formation [25] 
and of the coalition formation taking into account agents’ preferences to coalesce [23].  For some 
cases it turns out that this technique allows to obtain results which can not be even thought about 
using direct algorithms. 
 
Remark 5.  The results and technique obtained allow us to study power distribution in large 
organizations such as International Monetary Fund and United Nations Organizations as well as 
many other institutions. For  European Union and IMF several works have been done [10,12-15, 
18,22,24] including the one in which we studied some models of coalition formation on the basis of 
their regional proximity, economic relations, etc. [4] However, this work only takes a first step in this 
direction. 
 
Remark 6. Another interesting direction of research seems to be an analysis of power distribution 
surveying MPs in their desire to coalesce with their colleagues on different issues. We are going to 
start such surveys in one of the regional parliaments of the Russian Federation.   
 
Remark 7.  In [16] another index was introduced taking into account agents’ preferences to 
coalesce. It will be interesting to compare the results produced by these approaches on the same data. 
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Distribution of power of large factions (CPRF, «Edinstvo», Narodnyi Deputat)  
in the III  State Duma (scenario 0,6) 
Figure 5 
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Figure 9. Extended power index values 1 PI  for the III State Duma  
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Figure 10. Extended power index values 1 PI  for the III State Duma  

























































































































































































































































Figure 11. Extended power index values 1 PI  for the III State Duma  
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Figure 15. Dynamics of political positions (Narodny Deputat) 
 
 